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Abstract
Economists and other interested academics have committed significant time and effort to developing a set of circumstances under which an intelligent and circumspect form of racial profiling can serve as an effective tool in crime finding–the specific objective of finding criminal activity afoot. In turn, anti-profiling advocates tend to focus on the immediate efficacy of the practice, the morality of the practice, and/or the legality of the practice. However, the tenor of this
opposition invites racial profiling proponents to develop more surgical profiling techniques to employ in crime finding. In the article, I review the literature on group distinction to discern its relevance to the practice and study of racial
profiling. I argue that the costs of racial profiling extend beyond inefficient policing and the humiliation of law-abiding
minority pedestrians and drivers. Racial profiling is simultaneously a process of perception and articulation of relative
human characteristics (both positive and negative); it binds and reifies the concepts of race and criminality, fixing them
into the subconscious of the profiled, the profiler, and society at large.
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1. Introduction
The body of feelings which scholars, today, are so inclined to regard as constituting the substance of
prejudice is actually a resultant of the way in which
given racial groups conceive of themselves and of
others. A basic understanding of race prejudice must
be sought in the process by which racial groups form
images of themselves and others. This process…is
fundamentally a collective process. (Herbert Blumer,
1958, p. 3)
Contemporary analysis of racial profiling by criminologists and economists tends to focus narrowly on questions addressing the utility of profiling for crime finding
and the presence or absence of racial animus among
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profiling officers (Engel, Calnon, & Bernard, 2002; Engle,
2008; Knowles, Persico, & Todd, 2001; Skolnick &
Caplovitz, 2001; Gross & Livingston, 2002; Dominitz &
Knowles, 2006) to the exclusion of less immediate yet
profound sociological implications. As a result of the
limited scope of the racial profiling debate, profiling
scholars increasingly miss the proverbial forest for the
trees. In the forthcoming discussion, I pivot from the issue of racial profiling efficacy to that of the social construction of race in the context of racial profiling. I argue that when police engage in racial profiling race and
criminality take shape as co-constituted social constructs that inform a sense of racial hierarchy.
In the context of police work, the racial profile
should be understood as distinct from a witness description. A profile, for the purposes of the my analysis,
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is a police conception of a hypothesized, criminally active person while a witness description (which may include race or ethnicity in combination with other descriptors) is witness generated and used to capture
suspects only after a criminal allegation has been reported. Thus, police receive the witness description
from a first-hand observer of a criminal action, whereas the profile is constructed and deployed by the police
officer and/or the police institution based on the anticipated social location of a crime for which there is no
witness or direct evidence. Unlike the witness description, which is offered by a witness to a crime that has
allegedly transpired, police employ the racial profile
without direct knowledge of criminal activity afoot. The
profile informs the police officer’s expectation of precisely where to find criminal activity. In developing the
profile, the profiler anticipates the characteristics of
the perpetrator, who is an abstraction rather than a
real person.
My project in this paper is to use sociological investigations into the social construction of social groups—
both subordinate and superordinate—to illuminate the
co-construction of race and criminality through the tactic of racial profiling. By drawing theories regarding
group formation and group distinction into a racial profiling literature dominated by quantitative assessment, I
hope to initiate and encourage an analysis of the impact
of racial profiling that extends beyond the objective effectiveness of the practice in locating criminal activity
afoot. I look instead to the potential for racial profiling to
instill in the minds of the profiler, the profiled, and society at large the essential characteristics of those individuals affiliated with the targeted racial category.
The remainder of the paper is broken into three
sections. In Section 2, I present a brief overview of the
literature assessing the utility of racial profiling via statistical analysis. While offering an informative debate
on the immediate effectiveness of racial profiling,
quantitative studies have failed to consider many of
the sociological costs of the practice. I review sociological studies regarding the social production of social
groups and social group boundaries in Section 3 as part
of an effort to clearly articulate these costs. In Section
4, I delineate the process by which racial profiling establishes racial characteristics in a three-part schematic. I conclude that racial profiling by police fortifies and
conflates racial and criminal group classifications, and
that this negative distinction is in effect a statesponsored project in collective definition.
2. The Efficacy Question
Criminal law scholars in conjunction with a number of
economists have turned to the question of the efficacy
of racial profiling, specifically, the extent to which the
targeting of members of a racial group reduces criminal
activity (Knowles et al., 2001; Hernández-Murillo &
Social Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 52-59

Knowles, 2004; Harcourt, 2004; Harcourt, 2006; Borooah, 2001). Many of the scholars writing in this school
argue that police may engage in racial profiling absent
racial animus and, likewise, use racial profiling as a benign and effective tool for identifying criminal activity
(Engle et al., 2002). The logic of such argumentation
holds that racial profiling stemming from racial animus
should show a criminal activity “hit rate” (i.e., a positive finding of criminal conduct per stop/investigation)
among the profiled group that is lower than that of individuals outside the profiled group. If the hit rate of
the targeted racial group is equal to or greater than
that of the rest of the population despite heightened
police scrutiny, the profiling practice is thought to be
based on rational grounds rather than irrational racial
bias. This latter outcome, in theory, affirms the efficacy
of the practice and serves as prima facie evidence that
the police use race in a benign fashion rather than in a
manner intended to harm or subjugate the profiled racial group (Harcourt, 2004, p. 1293).
Scholars have critiqued statistical models constructed to test for “benign” racial profiling, primarily
by evaluating their effectiveness in revealing criminal
activity and criminal actors. For instance, alternative
statistical analyses exploring the “elasticity” of racial
profiling show that racial profiling efficacy has less of a
deterrent effect on African-Americans than on other
groups given the challenges African-Americans face in
finding alternative income streams. Associated findings
suggest that racial profiling may ultimately increase the
total amount of criminal activity in a given setting given
that non-profiled groups are likely to recognize when
police attention is narrowly focused elsewhere (Harcourt, 2004).
A few academic treatments of racial profiling have
challenged the practice from a more sociological point
of view, conveying the racializing elements inherent to
the act as an important outcome to be considered.
UCLA Law Professor Devon Carbado begins his critique
of Supreme Court decisions regarding the practice of
racial profiling with an account of the first few years after his immigration to the United States (Carbado,
2002). Carbado, a British national, found himself subject to racial profiling soon after he arrived in the U.S.,
and while he initially expressed anger during each incident of perceived police abuse, he eventually concluded that his claims of racial bias only served to complicate already precarious police encounters. Carbado
writes that he soon adopted the role of the passive African American male, intent on letting each momentary
police intrusion end without further incident. These
experiences collectively served as a “naturalization
ceremony within which our submission to authority reflected and reproduced black racial subjectivity” (Carbado, 2002, p. 957). Cabado states plainly, “We were
growing into our American profile” (p. 958).
I wish to link Carbado’s anecdotal illustration of the
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impact of racial profiling on the transformation of his
own subjectivity to sociological knowledge regarding
the utility of race in establishing group distinction,
group hierarchy and collective subjectivity in a given
social setting. This orientation toward the study of racial profiling shifts the outcome analysis from “crime
finding” to the less immediate issue of the dissemination of social meaning by way of a specific form of
state-sponsored group distinction. When applied to the
subject of racial profiling, the sociological study of the
production of group distinction reveals that role-play in
the profiling moment produces a specific understanding of social hierarchy for the profiled, and the profiler.
Through similar scripts played out countless times each
day, citizens and police alike come to naturalize racial
categories and racial role-play based on subordinate
and superordinate racial group status.
3. The Dynamic Process of Group Distinction
Despite its role as a pervasive and daunting force in
American society, “race” exists largely as a social construct and as a product of public definition (Omi &
Winant, 1994; Brubaker, 2004; Wacquant, 2004; Lopez,
2006; Davis, 2010). That is to say that race does not exist outside of collective understanding of the concept
and acquiescence to its predetermined logics. Scholars
of racial group formation and racial prejudice have
thoroughly examined and theorized the social process
of creating artificial, bounded categories to which individuals are assigned (Hacking, 1996). Though categorization serves a natural and necessary way of understanding the social world, the process itself establishes
distinctions that can immediately transform collective
perception of social reality (Hacking, 1996). The categorized subject often arises within and through the dynamic process of categorization.
The claim of dynamic nominalism is not that there
was a kind of person who became increasingly to be
recognized by bureaucrats or by students of human
nature but rather that a kind of person came into
being at the same time as the kind itself was being
invented. In some cases, that is, classifications and
our classes conspire to emerge hand in hand, each
egging on the other (p. 228).
The institutionalization of categories and labels often
impacts the extent to which a social group is assigned
meaning within the public consciousness. The institutional mobilization of social group categories through
institutional practices such as racial profiling set a path
for new societal perspectives on the social world and
thus new social realities. Institutional classifications
shape public understandings.
Scholars have identified the “dramatization of evil”
in the context of the criminal processing of the crimiSocial Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 52-59

nally accused within similar conceptual parameters
(Tannenbaum, 1957). For instance, the moment when
a young person is first placed in contact with the criminal justice system serves as a pivotal point in the
youth’s relationship with the state and the community
and, likewise, in the development of her perception of
self. To the extent that the criminal act results in the
state’s application of a criminal identity, the youth—
now categorized as “deviant” and “defendant”—falls
into a binary with the community (Tannenbaum, 1957).
If, alternatively, the community frames the youth’s
contact with the judicial system in cooperative terms,
all invested parties might be more likely to continue to
view that child as a part of (rather than alien to) the
community. In the application of criminal labels, the
act rather than the child’s life circumstance or constitution comes to represent the child to the state forum
and to society. The conceptualization of the child as
criminal—a “dramatization of evil” in the institutional
context of criminal procedure—is understood to have a
powerful normative effect. It shapes a new subjectivity
for the child in which the child plays the role of a deviant suffering from a dysfunctional disposition rather
than the role of a child having committed a single deviant act.
The expanded role of police in school discipline is
another telling example of the impact of dramatization.
As school administrators employ full time on-site police
forces, the school as an institution often “dramatizes”
and criminalizes behavior that has been found in every
schoolyard for centuries past (Fine et al., 2003). This is
not to discount the destructive impact incidents of violence can have on a school community. It is instead to
highlight how particular penal responses—locked exits,
on-site police, and routine criminal charging—establish
penal norms and penal identities in the minds of student, teacher, and administrator alike (Fine et al.,
2003). These norms are not benign. They inform group
distinctions by way of conceptualization—here, between bad behavior in school and criminal deviance. If
a child recognizes that she is being regulated in a manner similar to a prison, she accepts that stage and
script and is thus to some degree conditioned to play
the role appropriate for the setting.
Goffman’s idea of “stigma symbols” provides another frame by which to conceptualize the manner in
which social cues come to characterize social groups
(Goffman, 1963). Through symbols, social information
is conveyed to the social actors in a given setting. Children attending school under lock and key in the name
of their own security are not per se criminals, but develop criminal perspectives of themselves by way of
the signals embedded in the school setting (Goffman,
1963, p. 46). “The normal and the stigmatized are not
persons but rather perspectives. These are generated
in social situations during mixed contacts by virtue of
the unrealized norms that are likely to play upon the
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encounter” (1963, p. 138).
Race theorists have similarly argued race conceptualization and the cultivation of racial stigma to be a
“fundamentally collective process” (Blumer, 1958). In
this line of analysis, racial prejudice stems from the
identification one’s own racial group relative to another, and requires a clear and functional understanding
of how each group is defined to the exclusion of the
other. Thus, in order to conceive of two races, both
must be defined in terms of particular group characteristics. Racial prejudice cannot exist unless the social
position and character of each group is apparent to the
social actor. Moreover, such prejudice requires racial
corollaries, namely a specific conceptualization of a
subjugated and dominant group (Blumer, 1958). In taking the constitution of racial groups for granted rather
than accounting for their dynamic social production,
social actors and institutions ignore the tacit ways in
which specific conceptualizations of race inform human
thought, perception, action, and speech and likewise
group division in social life. Through these diverse social processes our minds structure and come to perceive
and act upon the social world (Brubaker, Loveman, &
Stamatov, 2004).
People around the world trade in “common sense”
(yet variable) racial categories based on the notion that
race and ethnicity exist as fixed and essential qualities
(Brubaker, 2002). The institutionalization of race has
been a significant subject of sociological study in part
because it sheds light on the classification processes
that can establish racial distinction (2002, p. 167). Critical analysis of such processes can pinpoint fundamental
elements of racial conflict and perception of racial threat.
This [analytical orientation] means thinking of ethnicity, race, and nation not in terms of substantial
groups or entities but in terms of practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive
frames, organizational routines, institutional forms,
political projects, and contingent events. It means
thinking of ethnicization, racialization, and nationalization, as political, social, cultural, and psychological processes. And it means taking as a basic analytical category not ‘the group’ as an entity but
groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual
variable. (p. 167)
Symbolic power, which manifests in various processes
of group distinction, can serve as an essential cog in
the process of collective understanding (Bourdieu,
1973). Through symbols, society coalesces to create
shared meaning. Symbols are at the core of the process
of public definition and the achievement of shared
meaning, as well as the vehicle by which meaning is
imposed on the public; they are fundamental to the reification of the social order. But more than organizing a
collective reality, the symbolism underlying human
Social Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 52-59

taxonomy holds the potential to commit “symbolic violence” in its facilitation of group domination. The term
“racial stereotype,” for instance, is central to this discussion, but its common understanding fails to capture
the dynamic, collective, and variable quality of racial
group distinction. The stereotype is a basic conceptualization of the symbolic power that facilitates the production and dissemination of racial distinction (Bourdieu, 1973, p. 169). Rather than being the product of
arbitrary mental processes, racial stereotypes are triggered by symbols and are borne of symbolic power.
They are thought to arise from natural inclinations, but
survive by way of systems of classification and corresponding mental structures that adhere to a larger and
implicit race orthodoxy (Bourdieu, 1973).
In shaping social groups and establishing group
boundaries, we use established categories as readily
accessible packets of information that help us comprehend the social world. Micro, person-to-person interactions inform racial categories and racial distinctions, as
do the meso-level actions of institutions, particularly
public institutions, which are recognized as representing affiliated publics and as operating in accordance
with the public will. To understand both how racial
meaning is produced and how it is digested in a given
social moment, one must critically assess the role of
the state in fostering and reifying racial distinction. This
analytical orientation has yet to be applied to the case
of racial profiling by police.
4. Racial Profiling and Racial Group Distinction
To characterize another racial group is, by opposition, to define one’s own group. This is equivalent
to placing the two groups in relation to each other,
or defining their positions vis-a-vis each other. It is
this sense of social position emerging from this collective process of characterization which provides
the basis for prejudice. (Herbert Blumer, 1958, p. 4)
The practice of racial profiling begins with a process of
racial distinction that takes place in the mind of the police officer or in the formulation of policing policy. The
profiling act itself informs the collective definition of
race by articulating racial group characteristics and, by
logical extension, racial group relations and relative racial group standing.
4.1. Constructing Race in Criminal Justice
In the following discussion I look to establish a basic
framework for the manner in which racial profiling policy and practice convey group distinction to various
segments of society within the distinct levels of formulation and execution. In the three hypothesized “theaters” of racial profiling presented in the framework,
specific segments of society witness or participate in
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racial profiling, or in some way come to understand racial profiling as a state-sponsored security project. As a
result, criminal characteristics attach to the targeted
racial classification. The three theaters are not mutually exclusive as one or all may manifest in the racial profiling moment.
Theater I: Lone Officer Construction of Racial Meaning: The individual officer makes an independent and
autonomous decision to profile a targeted racial group
member on the street in the context of a cursory investigation. Consider the following example. Patrol officers in a squad car stop a group of African-American
men driving late in the evening in a predominantly
white neighborhood and ask for identification and inquire as to their ultimate destination. The encounter
escalates to the point where the officers place the men
in handcuffs and sit them on the curb while conducting
a search of the vehicle. In this scenario, an association
between criminal propensity and African-American racial
classification is conveyed to the profiling officer, the profiled subject, and witnesses to the profiling event.
Theater II: Institutional Construction of Racial
Meaning—Internal: The police institution adopts an internal policy naming race as one of a litany of indicia of
criminality. Race is defined to all members of the police
institution and all other employees privy to the policy.
The profiling act by the lone officer in Theater I is not
predicated on racial profiling policy, as in Theater II.
However, if the police institution formally establishes
that officers should associate a racial classification with
criminal propensity, the conceptual association becomes ingrained within the police institution. Institutional construction of racial meaning in Theater II facilitates, endorses, and encourages profiling by officers in
the field and informs the quality of their engagement
with those associated with the targeted racial category.
In Theater II, the conflation of race and criminality is no
longer limited to the autonomous mind of an individual
officer. The conflation is instead explicit within the institution and legitimated by the institutional authority.
In Theater II, profiling loses its secretive character and
some of its accompanying stigma, and extends the coconstruction of race and criminality from the calculation of a single individual in a private sphere to the institutional consciousness encompassing the police collective.
Theater III: Institutional Construction of Racial
Meaning—External: The judicial, legislative, or executive branch of the local, state, or federal government
publicly endorses profiling. Here, the public institution
endorsing racial profiling validates the practice in the
“collective consciousness.” Racial profiling appears to
be the product of careful deliberation by elected leaders and/or ostensibly democratic institutions. The conflation of racial classifications and criminal propensity
finds public acceptance. For the sake of pragmatism,
deliberations about public safety include the contemSocial Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 52-59

plation of race, perhaps even regretfully. In advancing
from Theater I to Theater II, the construction of racial
meaning advances from the individual to the institutional, from the implicit to the explicit, from a function
of culture to an element of structure. 1 In the move
from Theater II to Theater III, the construction of racial
meaning comes to serve as an element of societal or
public knowledge, informing the collective understanding of race rather than merely the institutional understanding.
4.2. Racial Meaning in Washington, D.C.
An incident in Washington, D.C., in 2006 helps to illustrate the relationship between the three theaters of racial profiling and racial group distinction. After a highprofile murder in the city’s wealthy and largely white
Georgetown area, Andy Solberg, a white police commander for the city district that included Georgetown,
addressed a meeting of concerned local residents at a
neighborhood church. In reference to the homicide, Solberg offered the group what he likely understood to be
common-sense tips on neighborhood safety.
I would think that at 2 o'clock in the morning on the
streets of Georgetown, a group of three people,
one of whom is 15 years old, one of whom is a bald
chunky fat guy, are going to stand out…They were
black. This is not a racial thing to say that black
people are unusual in Georgetown. This is a fact of
life (The Washington Times, 2006).
When Solberg’s comments became a top local news
story, Charles Ramsey, the city’s African-American police chief, initially offered public support for the 19year department veteran, saying that Solberg was a
“very, very good guy” and had done great work in the
area of city in which he served as commander (Klein,
2006). An African-American store owner in Georgetown
interviewed by The Washington Post seemed startled
at the controversy saying, “How come people don’t
know that? These people live in a box? It is highly, highly unusual to see three young black males roaming
around up there in the residential neighborhoods.”
Charles Lawrence, an African-American, a former D.C.
School Board Council member and a friend of Solberg
1

An example can be found in an FBI policy proposed by the
Justice Department (DOJ) in 2008. In July of 2008, the Associated Press reported that DOJ had formulated a policy that
would allow the FBI to investigate Americans absent a report
of wrongdoing. Under the policy, the FBI would construct a
“terrorist profile” that included race and ethnicity, and use
data mining techniques to formulate a list of subjects to be
investigated. Attorney General Mukasey denied that Americans would be investigated solely because of race, but left
the door open to race and ethnicity being used to construct a
basis of suspicion (Jordan, 2008).
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said that he regretted the public criticism. In describing
the commander he pointed out that Solberg sent his
children to a public school that was 95% AfricanAmerican and coached a local soccer team that was
nearly entirely African-American. “What we really need
is more white folks who are not going to run and hide
but are committed to living here like Andy. I don’t
know any white person in the city who is less afraid of
or more fair about race” (Fisher, 2006). Ramsey reinstated Solberg to his original position two weeks after
assigning him to another district (Klein, 2006).
This account of racial profiling in Washington, D.C.
(a city fondly referred to in some circles as “Chocolate
City”) seems remarkable in a number of other respects.
First, and most relevant to the “theaters” framework, it
demonstrates the external pressure police officials face
in advancing racial profiling from Theaters I and II to
Theater III. The narrative suggests that Commander
Solberg, in advising Georgetown residents to racially
profile, had relayed a tactic considered unexceptional
in police circles. Solberg, acting in an advisory role to
the Georgetown neighborhood community, prescribed
racial profiling, and implicitly suggested that racial profiling among police was standard practice and “common sense.” For the presumably largely white audience
in attendance, he advised a particular understanding of
African-American presence in Georgetown. Though the
media reporting of Solberg’s statement included backlash over the comments, the ensuing dialogue was a
sincere public exploration of the extent to which race
and criminality could legitimately be associated. Local
media coverage of the incident does not show a single
police official denouncing Solberg’s statements or even
disagreeing with his proposition to the Georgetown
neighborhood group. In fact, the media record shows
sparse dissent from Solberg’s statements relative to
the number of affirmations. Individual and internal bureaucratic assessments of the link between conceptions of race and criminality were ultimately disseminated to public forums and local and national media
without direct challenge from the police institution.
Racial profiling conveys an implicit racial logic when
it is an ad hoc, individual practice or insulated within
the police institution. However, when adopted or inferred as institutional policy and publicized as either
sound policy or a sensible neighborhood safety precaution, the societal impact of racial profiling grows substantially. Explicit approval of racial profiling policy by
police, national security institutions, city councils, state
legislatures, or Congress, publicly defines the profiled
to the collective. It openly casts racial characteristics as
fixed in a social context that is understood to be democratic and subject to the will of the people. At which
point, the covert quality of racial profiling practice by
an individual or within a closed institutional system
yields to an advertised notion of criminality borne out
of democratic deliberations rather than hidden hunchSocial Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 52-59

es. Racial profiling in the theater of the public amounts
to more than a moment of individual shame for targeted racial group members. It functions more broadly as
a constructive enterprise that builds collective understanding of both race and criminality and reinforces
this understanding through subsequent, innumerable
police-public contacts.
4.3. Race, Group Distinction, and Social Closure
Sociologists have insisted that the process of racial distinction not be studied in a vacuum, but instead assessed as part of larger system of group boundary construction and maintenance (i.e., in relation to its codependence with social classifications such as class and
criminal record) (Schwartzmann, 2007). Mara Loveman
writes that, “[s]uch a framework could permit identification of the patterns of relations between particular
social processes and particular structural conditions
that trigger certain boundary dynamics; consequently,
it could improve social scientific understanding, explanation, and theorization” (Loveman, 1997) (my emphasis).
The investigation of interdependent forms of social
closure is significant to the development of a comprehensive understanding of the social consequences of
racial profiling. The embrace of racial profiling functions as a form of social closure as it marks, stigmatizes, and isolates by disseminating theories of racial
group distinction. The moment police choose to profile
a racial group or a single group member, the characteristic of criminality is freshly assigned to the group in at
least one of the three profiling theaters, typecasting
the group, and calling for the anticipation of criminal
conduct by other group members.
Police conflation of racial and criminal classification
in the project of racial profiling ultimately aligns with a
larger structural system of group subjugation. As the
“black” racial classification becomes a proxy for criminality and dangerousness and state actors orient penal
infrastructure to this predetermined racial target, the
group draws closer to civic death (Wacquant, 2005). In
the U.S., offenders are increasingly barred from college
loans, welfare benefits, public housing, and the right to
vote (Wacquant, 2005). Moreover, the ex-felon is unlikely to be hired as an employee in the public or private
sector, or to secure funds for job training. The pattern of
physical and symbolic exclusion produced through racial
profiling policy and practice aligns with these collective
penal effects to shape a robust racial-meaning making
system that undergirds racial hierarchy.
5. Conclusion
Race and criminality are malleable social constructs
subject to public definition. The meaning of the terms
takes shape through rhetoric, policy, and implicit and
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explicit symbolism and role-play. A narrow focus on
questions of racial profiling’s utility in crime finding
renders innocuous its important contributions to racial
meaning. The racial profiling endeavor, as practice and
policy, signals to society the loci of criminality. To find
criminal activity, look there. To identify criminal propensity, look here. In contrast to the description given
by a witness reporting a crime, racial profiling conveys
instructions on how to anticipate crime. It primes the
public to expect criminal acts from a specific category
of persons, and in the process informs and exacerbates
a form of social marginalization that has burdened the
U.S. since its very inception.
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